ABSTRACT Directional modulation (DM) refers to a class of efficient techniques for enhancing the physical layer security of wireless communications. However, conventional DM approaches cannot guarantee the transmission security when eavesdroppers are located close to the legitimate user. In this paper, to mitigate this problem, a new DM scheme with cooperative receivers (DM-CR) is proposed for secrecy communications. Specifically, the legitimate user employs multiple cooperative receivers, and a predefined distortion factor set is introduced to the beamforming vector. The proposed DM-CR scheme is able to guarantee transmission security regardless of the direction or location of the eavesdroppers. Furthermore, the average bit error probability of the proposed DM-CR scheme is investigated. Both analytical and simulation results are presented to show that the proposed DM-CR scheme significantly outperforms the benchmark in terms of the bit error rate, so as to provide secure transmission toward future wireless communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of key enabling transmission techniques for next generation wireless communications has gained considerable attention [1] - [3] . Specifically, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [4] and millimeter wave (mmWave) [5] techniques were developed for fully exploiting the communication resources in the spatial and frequency domains, respectively, to improve the transmission capacity. Non-orthogonal multiple access techniques were proposed to increase the maximum number of multiple connected users [6] . Full duplex techniques were introduced to wireless transceivers to enhance the attainable spectral efficiency [7] . Recently, physical layer (PHY) security has emerged as another important evolution towards future wireless communication networks [8] .
The main driving force behind the advances in PHY security is the promise of ensured secrecy or privacy without additional resources. Specifically, protecting the confidentiality of wireless communications is believed to be more challenging compared to that in its wireline counterpart, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless propagation medium [9] , [10] . Although security was originally viewed as a high-layer issue for consideration by cryptographic methods, PHY security based on information theory has recently gained increasing research attention, especially for wireless networks [11] - [13] . In wireless PHY security, the breakthrough is to exploit the characteristics of wireless channels, such as fading or noise, to transmit a message from a source to an intended destination, while keeping this message confidential from eavesdroppers [11] , [14] .
Directional modulation (DM), which is a novel PHY wireless security technology, has attracted considerable attention in recent years (see [15] - [24] and the references therein). It permits a user signal to be sent via a specified spatial direction, while simultaneously scrambling the constellation of the signal in the other directions in free-space transmission. In [20] , an analog transmitter architecture was introduced for synthesizing directional information based on near-field direct antenna modulation. In [21] , a low-complexity antenna subset modulation technique was proposed, which modulates the radiation pattern at the symbol rate by driving only a subset of antennas in the array. It is noted that the aforementioned DM techniques were implemented on the radio frequency (RF) frontend. That is, modulation occurs in the RF domain. However, the flexibility of implementing DM on the RF frontend is limited, which results in high complexity in the design of the constellation diagram. Recently, several DM techniques were proposed to bring forward the modulation process from RF to the baseband [22] - [24] . In [22] , a vector model for the DM transmitter was introduced, based on which rigorous necessary conditions for achieving DM characteristics were derived as well. In [23] , a baseband silent antenna hopping (SAH) transmission technique was developed to enhance PHY security by randomly switching off only one of the transmitting antennas. In [24] , a robust baseband DM synthesis method was proposed by considering the direction measurement errors. The approaches in [20] - [24] , however, do not necessarily guarantee the transmission security, when eavesdroppers are located along the same direction as the legitimate user. Hence, new DM techniques that (i) are implemented in the baseband; (ii) can guarantee the transmission security regardless of the directions of the eavesdroppers, are high desirable.
To guarantee transmission security, especially when the eavesdroppers are located along the same direction as the legitimate user, DM techniques based on the frequency diverse array (FDA) were proposed in [25] - [29] , which is capable of achieving angle-range dependent point-to-point PHY secure communications. In [28] , a random FDA-based DM technique on conjunction with artificial noise was devised. Moreover, in order to overcome the time-variant drawbacks of conventional FDA-based DM schemes, a timeinvariant angle-range dependent DM scheme based on the time-modulated logarithmically increasing frequency offset FDA was developed in [29] . The aforementioned approaches, however, cannot guarantee transmission security, when the eavesdroppers are located close to the legitimate user. Hence, developing efficient baseband DM algorithms to enhance transmission security is of special interest.
In this paper, we propose a class of improved baseband DM schemes with the aid of cooperative receivers. The proposed DM scheme with cooperative receivers (DM-CR) can guarantee the transmission security regardless of the direction or location of the eavesdroppers. The main contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows: 1) Proposing a new baseband DM-CR scheme to enhance PHY security of wireless communications. Our model assumes that the legitimate user is equipped with multiple cooperative single-antenna receivers, while an eavesdropper has a single-antenna receiver. The proposed scheme is capable of distorting both the phase and amplitude of the signal observed at the eavesdropper, irrespective of its direction or location. On the other hand, the legitimate user still can recover the transmitted symbols with a low-complexity detector; 2) Investigating both the legitimate user's and eavesdropper's average bit error probabilities of the proposed DM-CR scheme. The results indicate that the proposed DM-CR scheme can significantly outperform its conventional SAH counterpart [23] in terms of the bit error rate, and can guarantee the transmission security, irrespective of the direction or location of the eavesdroppers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the system model and explain the concept of the conventional transmission array. Section III presents the proposed DM-CR scheme, followed by an analysis on the average bit error probability in Section IV. Our numerical and comparative results are presented in Section V, followed by concluding remarks drawn in Section VI.
Notation: The bold upper case and bold lower case represent a matrix and vector, respectively. (·)
H is taken to mean the conjugate transpose of a matrix. Furthermore, R(·) and | · | indicate the real operator and the cardinality of a set, respectively. Finally, Q(·) refers to the Q-function.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we outline the system model and the conventional array transmission.
A. SYSTEM MODEL Consider a downlink communication system shown in Fig. 1 , where the transmitter (Alice) is equipped with N a antennas, and the legitimate user (Bob) with N b cooperative single-antenna receivers. These receivers are separately placed along different spatial directions, in order to retain spatial multiplexing [16] , [30] . There is also an eavesdropper (Eve) having a single-antenna receiver. We assume that the directions of Bob's receivers are available at Alice and Bob, while Eve tries to hide its existence and Alice cannot obtain its direction. We assume a uniform linear array (ULA) at Alice and set the phase reference at the center of the array geometric. Let B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b M }, where E[|b m | 2 ] = 1, be a set of symbols belonging to an M -ary constellation of amplitude-phase modulation (APM). Then the received signal along any direction θ is given by where h H (θ ) is the free space channel model expressed as [31] h
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and b m ∈ B is the transmitted symbol, w ∈ C N a ×1 is the beamforming vector, n is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with n ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ). Furthermore, h(θ) ∈ C N a ×1 is the free space channel vector, and λ is the wavelength, while d ≤ λ/2 is the antenna spacing of the ULA at Alice.
B. CONVENTIONAL ARRAY TRANSMISSION
In this transmission technique, Bob is equipped with one single-antenna receiver (i.e., N b = 1). Since the transmitter can obtain the direction of Bob's receiver, Alice can direct the main beam towards the desired direction of θ T by setting
. Then, the noiseless signal received along an arbitrary direction θ is given by [21] 
where µ(θ, θ T ) is a real scaling factor. Clearly, by setting w =
This means that a receiver can receive the strongest signal power, when located along the desired direction θ T . Moreover, the noiseless signals received along all directions differ only in power. In other words, both Bob's and Eve's receivers observe effectively the same information, as portrayed in Fig. 2 . Hence, equipped with a sufficiently sensitive receiver, Eve can effectively decode the messages sent by Alice irrespective of its direction. 
III. DIRECTIONAL MODULATION WITH COOPERATIVE RECEIVERS
This section details the proposed DM-CR scheme, which is capable of distorting the phase in addition to the amplitude of the signal observed at Eve irrespective of its direction, while Bob still can recover the transmitted symbols with a low-complexity detector.
A. TRANSMISSION AT ALICE
The essential idea behind the proposed scheme is to introduce a distortion factor into the beamforming vector such that the signal observed at Eve is distorted. In addition, the employed distortion factor is randomly selected from a predefined set, which enhances the security of the transmission.
In DM-CR, we assume that N b ≥ 2 and each receiver of Bob corresponds to a particular distortion factor. Since Bob is equipped with N b receivers, their corresponding distortion factors are expressed as
, where α i = e jϕ i . Note that this set is assumed perfectly known at Alice and Bob. Firstly, a target receiver is randomly selected from Bob's receivers. We assume that the corresponding index of the selected receiver is i (i = 1, . . . , N b ), that this receiver is located along direction θ i , and that the channel vector from Alice to this receiver is h H (θ i ). Furthermore, Alice directs the main beam towards the selected receiver and introduces the corresponding distortion factor to the beamforming vector. Finally, the beamforming vector in the proposed DM-CR scheme is constructed as
where α i ∈ A represents the distortion factor corresponding to Bob's i th receiver. It can be readily shown that only Bob's i th receiver can receive the strongest signal power by setting w i ∈ W, where W = [w 1 , . . . , w N b ] denotes the alphabet of the beamforming vector. Then, the transmitted signal vector may be written as
B. DETECTION AT BOB
The signal vector observed at Bob can be expressed as
where
×N a is the downlink channel matrix between Alice and Bob, and n B is the AWGN vector with n B ∼ CN (0, σ 2 B I N b ). Explicitly, with the aid of (3) one can decompose (6) into
Furthermore, when the number of Alice's antennas is large enough, µ(θ k , θ i ) approaches zero and µ(θ i , θ i ) = 1.
Hence, we have
Recall that Bob knows the directions of its receivers. Based on (6), Bob may employ joint detection for both the index of the selected receiver i and the transmitted symbol b m . Then, the joint maximum likelihood (ML) detector is formulated as <î,b m >= arg min
where X = W × B stands for the alphabet of the transmitted signal vector. Alternatively, based on (8), the reducedcomplexity decoupled detector may also be employed, which treats the detection of the index of the selected receiver i and that of the transmitted symbol b m , separately. In this reduced-complexity variant, we havê
Since that each receiver of Bob corresponds to a particular distortion factor, and that Bob can effectively detect the index of its selected receiver, the distortion factor employed by Alice is available at Bob. Hence, Bob can effectively recover the transmitted symbol b m with a low-complexity detector.
C. DETECTION AT EVE
With the aid of (3), the signal observed at Eve can be expressed as
where θ E is Eve's direction, and h H (θ E ) ∈ C 1×N a is the channel vector from Alice to Eve, while n E is the AWGN with n E ∼ CN (0, σ 2 E ). Note that, α i µ(θ E , θ i ) is complex and changes with the index of the selected receiver (i.e., with i), since α i = e jϕ i is complex and µ(θ E , θ i ) is a real scaling factor with µ(θ E , θ i ) ≤ 1. As a result, both the phase and amplitude of the signal observed at Eve is distorted, regardless of its direction. As shown in Fig. 3 , Eve's constellation appears randomized due to the random choice of a targeted receiver of Bob for each transmitted symbol, even under the worst-case scenario that Eve's receiver is located along the same direction as one of Bob's receivers.
Note that it is difficult for Eve to know the employed distortion factor α i , even under the worst-case scenario that the distortion factor set A is available at Eve. This is because Eve do not know which receiver of Bob is selected, and hence cannot decide the corresponding distortion factor. 
However, due to term α i µ(θ E , θ i ) distorts the signal observed at Eve, the detection performance will be seriously degraded.
In the proposed DM-CR scheme, although Bob is required to configure multiple cooperative receivers with increased complexity, the proposed scheme can guarantee the enhanced transmission security as rewards.
IV. AVERAGE BIT ERROR PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
We continue by studying both the Bob's and Eve's average bit error probabilities (ABEPs) of the proposed DM-CR scheme, when joint ML detection of (9) and (12) is considered.
A. BOB's AVERAGE BIT ERROR PROBABILITY
We employ the union-bound approach for deriving Bob's analytical ABEP of the proposed DM-CR scheme. Towards this end, we have
where P(x m i → x n j ) denotes the pairwise error probability (PEP), while e(x m i , x n j ) represents the number of different bits between x m i and x n j . The PEP P(x m i → x n j ) is given by
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Since n B is the AWGN vector with n B ∼ CN (0, σ 2 B I N b ), the left-hand-side of (15) is a Gaussian random variable obeying N (0,
. As a result, the PEP P(x m i → x n j ) may be given as in (14) .
B. EVE's AVERAGE BIT ERROR PROBABILITY
Denote by E i,m (θ E ) the noiseless signal observed at Eve, i.e.,
and Y i,m (θ E ) represent the real and imaginary parts of E i,m (θ E ), respectively.
Similar to (13), Eve's analytical ABEP is given by
Since the target receiver is randomly selected from Bob's receivers, the PEP P(b m → b n ) may be expressed as
where P(b m → b n |w i ) represents the conditional PEP. Finally, substituting (17) into (16) gives rise to
Assume that quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) modulation is employed, and the constellation is B = 
where u n = 1, n = 2, 3
, and v n = 1, n = 3, 4
Proof: Denote by N 1 and N 2 the real and imaginary parts of n E , respectively, i.e., n E = N 1 +jN 2 . Furthermore, we have
Similarly, we have
Hence, the conditional PEP P(b m → b n |w i ) can be written as in (19) . Note that Eve's analytical ABEP P E is dependent on a specific direction of Eve. Since Alice cannot obtain Eve's direction, we defineP E as the average value of P E over all possible directions of Eve. Then, the average value of P E can be expressed asP
where f (θ E ) is the probability density function of θ E in set .
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present our performance results characterizing the proposed DM-CR scheme. For comparison, the performance of conventional SAH [23] is also considered. Throughout the simulations, we use QPSK only for the data streams' transmission, and the antenna spacing d is fixed to λ/4. Furthermore, the other parameters are listed in Table 1 , where the identical noise power is assumed at both Bob and Eve ( i.e., σ 2 B = σ 2 E ), while the signal to noise ratio (SNR) is defined as 1/σ 2 B . Fig. 4(a) shows the simulated bit error rate (BER) performance of both the proposed DM-CR scheme and its conventional SAH counterpart, where both the joint and decoupled detection results are portrayed. As can be observed from the figure, Bob's decoupled detection and joint detection appear to have only a marginal difference in performance. This is because the beamforming employed in the proposed DM-CR scheme is capable of successfully directing the main beam towards Bob's selected receiver for the purpose of facilitating the decoupled detection. More explicitly, Bob has a considerable BER advantage over Eve in the proposed DM-CR scheme, while the BER performance of Bob is the same as that of Eve in its conventional SAH counterpart. This is owning to the fact that the proposed DM-CR scheme is capable of distorting the signal observed at Eve, regardless of its direction. Fig. 4 (b) presents Eve's BER performances of both the proposed DM-CR and conventional SAH schemes against Eve's direction θ E . As expected, the performance of the proposed DM-CR scheme is insensitive to Eve's direction. By contrast, the conventional SAH scheme can no longer guarantee secure transmission, when the direction of Eve is the same as that of Bob. Hence, in comparison with SAH, the proposed DM-CR scheme demonstrates a clear security enhancement.
A. COMPARISON OF TRANSMISSION SCHEMES

B. EFFECTS OF THE NUMBER OF ALICE's ANTENNAS
Fig. 5 presents the BER performance for different numbers of Alice's antennas, where both joint and decoupled detection results are portrayed. According to Fig. 5(a) , Bob's BER performance is degraded, when Alice is equipped with less antennas, i.e., when the value of N a decreases. Furthermore, as can be seen from Fig. 5(a) , the difference between the joint and decoupled detection results decreases, when the numbers of Alice's antennas is large. This is owing to the fact that the beamforming employed in the proposed DM-CR scheme can successfully eliminate the inter-receiver interference at Bob, especially when the number of Alice's antennas is large enough. However, as shown in Fig. 5(b) , Eve's BER is very high over all the considered SNR region regardless of the value of N a , thanks to the distortion factors.
C. EFFECTS OF THE NUMBER OF BOB's RECEIVERS
Fig. 6 presents the BER performance for different numbers of Bob's receivers, where both the simulated and analytical results are portrayed. As can be observed from Fig. 6(a) , Bob's BER performance is degraded with the increase of N b . This is because the difficulty of detecting the index of Bob's selected receiver increases with the increase of N b . As can be seen from Fig. 6(b) , due to the distortion factors, Eve's BER VOLUME 6, 2018 is very high over all the considered SNR region, regardless of the number of Bob's receivers. Hence, the optimum number of Bob's receivers that yields both a high BER for Eve and a low BER for Bob is two. It is further noted that our theoretical analysis forms tight upper bounds of the simulation results for all the values of N b investigated. More specifically, Bob's theoretical upper bounds become very tight when the SNR is sufficiently high, while Eve's theoretical BER closely matches its simulated counterpart in all the considered SNR region. These accurate analytical BER results will help Alice assess the risk of eavesdropping attack for a certain distortion factor set A in the high SNR region. Hence, with the aid of our derived formulas (13) , (18) and (24), Alice can easily determine a desirable A, in order to fulfill Bob's BER requirement, while rendering Eve's detection results defective.
D. EFFECTS OF DISTORTION FACTORS
Finally, Fig. 7 shows the effects of the distortion factors on the analytical BER performance for both Bob [ Fig. 7(a) ] and Eve [ Fig. 7(b) ], where the number of Bob's receivers is Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) that the BER performance of the proposed DM-CR scheme is sensitive to the distortion factors. As can be seen from Fig. 7(a) , Bob's minimum BER may be achieved when α 1 = α 2 , while Bob's maximum BER may be achieved with α 1 = −α 2 . According to Fig. 7(b) , Eve's maximum BER may be achieved when α 1 = α 2 = −1, because the noiseless signal observed at Eve is located at the diagonal quadrant of the transmitted symbol. Furthermore, according to Fig. 7(b) , Eve's minimum BER may be achieved when α 1 = α 2 = 1, since in this case the noiseless signal observed at Eve is located at the identical quadrant of the transmitted symbol. Specifically, the simulation results shown in Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) suggest that setting the distortion factors to α 1 = α 2 = −1 constitutes the optimal choice for minimizing Bob's BER, while maximizing Eve's BER. However, identical distortion factors may have some hidden risks. For instance, once the distortion factor set A is obtained by Eve, Eve can effectively recover the transmitted symbol by compensating the distortion, no matter which receiver of Bob is selected. Hence, to compromise the BER performance and the hidden risks, a distortion factor set with both elements close to -1 but not equal to each other may be more favorable in practical applications.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new baseband directional modulation scheme with cooperative receivers for secrecy communications was conceived. The average bit error probability of the proposed DM-CR scheme was investigated. Both analytical and simulation results were presented to demonstrate that the proposed DM-CR scheme can significantly outperform its conventional SAH counterpart in terms of the BER, and can guarantee the transmission security irrespective of the direction or location of the eavesdroppers. Furthermore, it was revealed that the optimum number of the legitimate user's receivers that yields both a high BER for the eavesdropper and a low BER for the legitimate user is two. 
